BeyondProxy linked to this rare footage of Cundill speaking of his investment philosophy (Value) and approach to capturing the value premium. Peter, a Canadian, found that no matter what was happening in the home market, there was usually a market in which one could find plenty of beaten up stocks. He made it his mission to spend several months each year in the country that had stocks that had been beaten up the most in the prior year. Hence, There is Always Something To Do, which can be found in the bookstore above.

Peter suffered from a neurological condition, which was diagnosed soon after he gave this lecture, and he died in 2011.

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The author of that post suggests that the CAPE is useless for comparisons since FAS 157 changed accounting for fair value. A review of other posts recently made by the author indicate that he is fairly bullish on not just the market, but also the economy.

I am a rational optimist and I would like to be as optimistic as “valueplays”, but he is wrong to assume that the reason for the concern about market valuation is merely because of the level of the CAPE. As I have written in more detail before, and even indicated in that last post, it is the other statistics that consistently corroborate the CAPE that indicate there is not something fundamentally different about this period compared with prior periods.

Consider, for example, Tobin’s Q ratio, which measures the market’s price relative to the replacement cost of the assets for all of the companies in the market. It is higher than at any time in history bar the dot com bubble when investor psyche went overboard on “it’s different this time” thinking.

Notice that Tobin’s Q is not a straight measure of corporate book value, for which it is possible that one component–retained earnings–could be distorted by FAS 157. Tobin’s Q is an estimate of the cost to replace the assets that are already in productive use. It may not be perfect, but it corroborates the implications of the CAPE.

Consider, also,  Warren Buffett’s favorite indicator of market valuation known as Buffett’s P/E given by the following ratio:

(Market capitalization) / (Nominal GDP)

Notice FAS 157 would have little influence on nominal GDP. Buffett’s P/E is more than two standard deviations higher than it’s average since 1950. Again, the only time it has been higher was during the ridiculous dot com bubble.

I have also written that the recovery has been weak based on my favorite employment statistic. But, earlier this month ”valueplays” saw “Positive Signs Everywhere“. I certainly hope he is correct, but this market looks to me like it is one misstep away from a long fall based on the above statistics and:

1. Total debt is higher than at any time in history (there was no de-leveraging);
2. Interest rates are lower and the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet is higher than any time in history. The Fed is practically out of bullets; and
3. Corporate profits–the most mean-reverting statistic in finance according to Jeremy Grantham at GMO–are as high as they have been in history;

Invest accordingly.

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We still have some way to go before asset prices normalize for the S&P 500 index, which makes up about 90% of US stock market capitalization. The CAPE and all price-to-fundamental ratios like it (e.g. Tobin’s Q, Buffett’s PE, etc.) are still high and they are all higher than their long-run averages by about the same percentage. That consistency reinforces the notion that it’s the market’s price that is the issue and not that there is something fundamentally different this time with respect to earnings, free cash flow or the replacement cost of business assets.

The CAPE is 24.90 after (last week’s) drop in the S&P 500 to 1970.89. Even if we generously assumed that real S&P earnings for the most recently available month (March 2015’s $100.57) was the proper figure to use in the denominator (as opposed to the lower real $79.13 S&P earnings over the last ten years), the S&P 500 index could still fall another 15% before the CAPE reached its long-term average (16.63). Unfortunately, no one knows when it will regress back to that level. It is impossible to predict it.

In addition, few consider that maybe the current CAPE average is too high. Both the numerator and denominator in the CAPE are adjusted for CPI inflation, so it reduces the ratio to long-run fundamental market and business activity. The CAPE averaged 14.78 from January 1881 through December 1994, which is 11% less than today’s CAPE average since 1881, largely because today’s CAPE average includes the greatest bubble in the market’s history (the dot com bubble). That suggests the S&P could fall 25% from 1970.89 even with the generous earnings figure used for the denominator.

PAR does not care about the market as a whole when it invests client funds in its Separate Account Value Investing (SAVI) strategies, so PAR is not investing as if the market were going to drop another 25%. PAR is still looking from the bottom up for SAVI  clients because that is the way to uncover opportunities that have an MOS, but there should be no surprise that there are far fewer opportunities when the CAPE is 24.9, like today, than when the CAPE is 13.3 as it was in March of 2009.

March 2009  was the last time PAR became fully invested. Most of those new positions in which PAR invested in 4Q08 and 1Q09 to become fully invested were gradually liquidated over the subsequent twelve- to eighteen-months and have largely sat in cash  since. PAR’s SAVI strategies are only a small part of PAR’s clients’ portfolios.

PAR Wealth Management also offers traditional wealth management services as a fee-only fiduciary. PAR Wealth Management is a goals-based financial adviser. Once a client’s goals are quantified and prioritized, PAR Wealth Management allocates that client’s capital to investments with qualities that match those specific goals and how a client feels about risk. Capital for short- and intermediate-term goals are generally allocated to safer, more-liquid investments. For a large percentage of a client’s long-term goal allocation, PAR Wealth Management generally chooses external managers who demonstrate an ability to capture factor premia.

Update 8-24-15: I do not want to leave the impression that the only way for the CAPE to normalize is for the S&P 500 to drop precipitously. The other way is for the denominator–earnings–to rise considerably. But, the denominator will not rise without growth in value-creating economic activity in the private sector, and that takes time. Value-creation has been stagnant since 2008 and there is little on the horizon to suggest that the private sector will turn robust. In any case, the numerator (the level of the S&P 500) would have to rise much slower than the denominator. So, either way, whether it is a numerator that falls or a denominator that rises or some combination, it portends low stock market returns over the next decade. As I have written before, invest accordingly.

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The first statistic is a macroeconomic indicator called the Employment-to-Population Ratio (E/Pop, to distinguish it from E/P or earnings yield). I prefer E/Pop to all other employment-health indicators because, unlike the unemployment and labor force participation rates, it takes the least amount of manipulation to calculate it.

E/Pop is simply the number of adults (16+ YO) employed in the US divided by the number of people 16+ living in the US who are not in institutions (jail, mental health facilities, etc.) or in the military. No one has to guess whether these people are “looking” for work or really “participating”. It measures the  number of people truly working relative to the number of us relying on those who are working to pay our collective bills. After all, the money that pays our bills can only come from people who produce; it is not created from thin air.

If there is a weakness in this indicator, it is that it overestimates economic strength by including in the numerator those who work part time, especially now when the proportion of part time workers is elevated.

http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/Full-Time-vs-Part-Time-Employment.php

Robust economic conditions are indicated by relatively high E/Pop ratios and weak conditions by relatively low E/Pop ratios.

The E/Pop has indicated that the economy is weak and that this “recovery” since 2007 could easily be labeled “stagnation”. The E/Pop plummeted in the housing crisis and despite unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus, it has barely gotten off the mat since. May’s reading announced today is 59.4%. The last time (before the current stagnation) that it was this low was in April 1984 when the economy was still digesting Paul Volcker’s attempt to choke off the inflation debacle of the late 1970s.

The second statistic–one that continues to worry me about the stock market–is Robert Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted PE (CAPE) ratio. The latest reading shows that the stock market’s price equals 27.38 times its trailing ten-year earnings. The last time it was this high was July 2007, almost to the day that the housing crisis began and about one year before the stock market plummeted in response. It was higher only twice before in history, just before two of history’s most terrifying market crashes.

I write about these “macro” themes because, as Howard Marks says, it’s important for “intelligent investors” to know where the economy and market stand as they go about their business of evaluating businesses one-by-one and determining whether they can purchase those businesses at prices that deliver a Margin of Safety. Since 2011, the level of the CAPE helps explains why investors have found so few opportunities that possess a Margin of Safety. Invest appropriately.

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“At the quarter-century mark of 1925, the great bull market was under way, and Graham, then 31, had enjoyed impressive success as an investor in the challenging years since 1915. During an early-1929 conversation with business associate Bernard Baruch, both agreed that the market had advanced to ‘inordinate heights, that the speculators had gone crazy, that respected investment bankers were indulging in inexcusable high jinx, and that the whole thing would have to end up one day in a major crash.’ Years later Graham lamented, ‘What seems really strange now is that I could make a prediction of that kind in all seriousness, yet not have the sense to realize the dangers to which I continued to subject the Account’s capital [money he managed for clients, family and friends],’ which, by 1932, had shrunk to 15% of its 1929 value. Graham’s prodigious intellect was not defense enough against what he later described as a ‘bad case of hubris.’”

Surely Graham was not alone in having at least a vague notion in the mid- to late-20s that things would end so badly in the summer of 1932. What he and others lacked was not so much the conviction, but the moral courage and the temerity to say ‘No’ when everyone else was saying ‘Yes.’”

It is not enough to use reason and diligent analysis to draw a conclusion that is different from the consensus.  One must also act on that conclusion. That is the most difficult part for even the smartest of investors. Investment success in this case is not a question of intelligence, but the ability to stand alone, which researchers have shown causes emotional pain akin to being ostracized by your tribe.

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Among my clients’ ten corporate exposures is a gambling-related company (and it’s also a spinoff) and a defense-related company (a spinoff)–the “bets and bombs” components of the “butts, booze, bets and bombs”. PAR previously invested in the butts (UVV) and booze (TAP) and other bomb (NOC) components. It is much easier to find a Margin of Safety in these areas. Enjoy:

http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/02/13/sin-vestors-can-reap-smoking-hot-returns/?mod=djintinvestor_t

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The S&P 500 Index delivered a 13.69% return in 2014 as the market continued to reach new highs after reaching new highs in 2013. This year, for the first time, I have highlighted the years corresponding with the inflation and bursting of the DotCom bubble (grey) in addition to the Great Depression (yellow) and the Housing bubble (blue).

Clearly, there were more extremes and more years of extreme results during the Great Depression than the two most recent crises. In eight of the years from 1928 through 1938, the market either lost or gained more than 30%. In contrast, in each of the DotCom and the Housing bubble periods, the market had just one year of such an extreme.

There were obviously more extremes and more years of extreme outcomes during the Great Depression than the two most recent crises. Over the eight years from 1928 to 1938, generic cialis sales grew by 40% and you can read more about these successes on the main page of our website.

In half of all years since 1825, the market delivered a return between -10% and +10%. So, if we narrow the definition of extreme to losses or gains of more than 10%, the Great Depression experienced nine such years, the DotCom bubble five, and the Housing bubble five.

Many argue that the Federal Reserve is getting better at managing crises, and the above data would seem to agree. The Great Depression was the first crisis that the Fed experienced and many recent policy makers, including Ben Bernanke, went to school on Great Depression policy. On the other hand, others argue that the mere awareness of a Federal Reserve “put” is creating crises that future Fed policy will be unable to fix. I guess we will know who is right soon enough.

The return mode is still 0% to 10%. In a large majority (71%) of years, the market is positive. And, the market experiences declines of 10% (20%) or more in a mere 13.7% (4.9%) of years. So, an outsider’s perspective indicates that investing in the broad market is clearly in your favor, in part because of natural inflationary increases, and in part because of real increases in productivity and earnings due to technological and human capital advances.

The insider’s perspective is a different story. As of January 19, 2015, Shiller’s CAPE sits at 26.7, which is 61% above the average CAPE of 16.6 since January, 1881. The only periods in which the CAPE was higher than today were 1929 – 1930, immediately before the Great Depression; late 1996 – 2002, immediately before and after the DotCom bubble burst; and from late 2004 – late 2007, immediately before the bursting of the housing bubble. So, the CAPE is not a great short-term timing mechanism because recent extremes were able to persist for long periods, but it is an excellent indicator that the piper has to be paid eventually.

Other market indicators including Tobin’s Q and Buffett’s PE confirm the implications of Shiller’s CAPE. Investors who were cautious in periods like this had dry powder to exploit market declines. Investors who chased returns in periods like this rode the market without a brake (a hedge) and often only got off the ride by jumping off at market lows.

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“Over the past 100 years the returns from smaller companies have exceeded those of larger companies. It is also true that stocks with low valuations (i.e. lower prices relative to earnings and book values) have generated better returns than those with high valuations. What is less certain is whether these tendencies will continue in the future…”

–Burton G. Malkiel, criticizing investors like Buffett who have captured factor premia for decades

To be fair, Malkiel goes on to list other reasons to be skeptical of smart beta, but number one is that it might not work in the future. Malkiel’s comment is almost akin to a health policy expert telling us, “Sure, Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine has worked for 62 years, but let’s give it a little more time before we declare victory.” I guess we will never know whether the polio vaccine will become ineffective, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t exploit its use today. But, Malkiel would condemn investors into accepting market risk in order to receive reduced fee invoices. What if you didn’t want market risk? Or, what if you wanted more risk than the market provided (as PAR did in 1Q09 when it used some leverage to become fully invested)?

Factor premia have existed for more than 100 years. The premia exist either because of sub-optimal investor behavior (mostly my view) or because factor investors are being compensated for risk (mostly the view of EMH proponents). Either way, factor premia are not likely to disappear for the long-term investor, so we might as well exploit factor premia for the long-term portion of our portfolios.

https://blog.wealthfront.com/smart-beta/

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Hire advisors who understand risk and know how to manage it well.

The Market from the Top Down, the Federal Reserve, and the Economy

PAR’s pessimism is due to a dearth of bottom-up bargains. (Few businesses can be purchased at prices that deliver a margin of safety.)

A top-down analysis reveals a significantly overvalued market, which merely confirms the dearth of bargains. Shiller’s CAPE, Buffett’s PE, Tobin’s Q, and profit margins are at or near all-time highs (other than during the dotcom bubble) while interest rates are near historic lows.

Shiller’s CAPE

As of July 3, the CAPE was 26.6, which would require a 31% drop to reach its post-war average of 18.4 (including the dotcom bubble in that average).

Shiller’s CAPE (S&P 500 Index /10-Year Average Earnings)

Source: Multipl.com and www.econ.yale.edu/~Shiller/data.htm

I have been writing about the CAPE for a while in letters and on my blog. Although it has been above its long-term average since early 2009 (and for most of the time since 1990), it is not a good indicator for short-term market timing.

At these CAPE levels, stocks are unlikely to deliver much more than low single-digit returns per year over the next decade and the market is vulnerable to large corrections. Since 1881, with the exception of the dotcom bubble, every time that the CAPE reached 24 (April 1901, November 1928, and January 1966) inflation-adjusted losses of 29% or more followed within 4.5 years and peak-to-trough losses were much higher. In this cycle, the CAPE first reached 24 in November 2013. But the market has also severely corrected when the CAPE was lower than 24.

William Poundstone wrote the following in his latest book, Rock Breaks Scissors:

“Today’s investors have every right to feel cursed. They have had few opportunities to buy at average (CAPE levels) much less low ones…The average return at (a CAPE of 23) is something like 2 percent over the coming 20 years. Never has the twenty-year stock market returned as much as 3 percent annually (after inflation) when the (CAPE) was 23 or higher.”

Largely because of the CAPE level, as of May 31, 2014, GMO thinks that US large-cap and small-cap stock real returns will average -1.5% and -4.5%, respectively, each year for the next seven years.

Market Cap-to-GDP (AKA Buffett’s PE) 

Buffett’s favorite measure of market price-to-earnings is the ratio depicted in the chart below, which indicates that the market is about 45% overvalued.

Source Listed in Chart

GMO believes that whenever a measure of market prices (relative to market fundamentals) is two standard deviations from its long-term average, then that market is in a bubble. According to GMO’s definition, Buffett’s PE indicates the market is currently in a bubble. However, Grantham prefers the CAPE (along with other measures) over Buffett’s PE and he believes the S&P 500 will not enter bubble territory until it reaches about 2,250. As of July 4, it’s only 13% away from that mark. 

Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q Ratio is a measure of the market’s price-to-book ratio. It equals market value relative to the cost to replace the assets of the businesses in the market. The numerator is the same as the one in Buffett’s PE Ratio. The Q indicates that the market is about 41% overvalued.

Source Listed in Chart 

Profit Margins

Corporate profit margins are at all-time highs. Because high profit margins attract competition in free markets, Jeremy Grantham of GMO calls margins the most mean-reverting statistic in finance and economics. If margins decline, EPS will decline, leading to a decline in stock prices. 

Corporate Profit Margins

Source Listed in Chart and dshort.com

John Hussman of Hussman Funds notes that investors who pay high prices for high profit margins are almost always disappointed in profit growth later.

Source: Hussman Funds

Interest Rates

Interest rates are important because declining rates translate into a higher present value of cash flow, which translates into higher asset prices. It is hard to imagine rates falling much more from here after the 33-year bull market in bonds, but it is easy to imagine rates rising, which will cause present values (and markets) to decline, all other things being equal. 

Source Listed in Chart

The Federal Reserve

“This goes down right now as the mother of all reflation strategies by the Federal Reserve…The cycle starts off with asset inflation, followed by credit inflation, followed by price inflation, and then by wage inflation.” –David Rosenberg, on CNBC’s Squawk on the Street 6/24/14

It appears that a major reason for the market’s rise since 2010 has been the extraordinary measures used by the Federal Reserve to offset the effects of the financial crisis. Quantitative Easing 1, 2, and 3 (QE) has created an environment for company stock buybacks and M&A activity largely by lowering the cost of corporate debt issuance to finance buybacks and M&A. 

In 2013, S&P 500 company buybacks totaled $477 Billion, the most since the 2007 peak. Fortuna Advisors estimates that since the 2009 lows, buybacks juiced cumulative returns from a natural 80% to a steroid-like 178% reached in the first quarter of 2014.

(http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/corporations-cant-stop-gobbling-up-their-own-stock/2014/05/09/83c8ddb0-d6e6-11e3-aae8-c2d44bd79778_story.html)

Of course, it is what happens at the margin—the last trade—that determines your portfolio value. The stock of corporate buybacks over the last three years will be of little consolation in a declining market unless you have already sold into buybacks and are holding the proceeds in cash. 

Further evidence of a Fed-fueled market include: 1) margin debt used to purchase equities is as high as in the dotcom bubble; 2) the junk bond market has been raging again; and 3) IPOs—insiders who want to cash out before the punch bowl is pulled away—are as high as in the dotcom era. 

Correlation is not causation, but there is good reason to believe the Federal Reserve’s extraordinary balance sheet expansion since the crisis (depicted below) is responsible for much of the froth.

Source: ZeroHedge.com

A 2000 publication from the CFA Institute’s Research Foundation studied asset class returns during periods of expansionary and restrictive monetary policy. It should give pause.  

The study (http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/abs/10.2470/rf.v2000.n3.3912) covered the years 1960 through 1998. The average monthly nominal stock market return in expansionary periods was 1.64%. The average in restrictive periods was 0.38%. All eleven periods of expansionary monetary policy over those 38 years resulted in a positive monthly average real return, but five out of the ten (50%) restrictive periods resulted in negative average monthly real returns. Clearly, the maxim “Don’t fight the fed” has a lot of truth in it.

David Tepper

One investor who refused to fight the Fed was the highest earning hedge fund manager in 2013. On September 24, 2010, David Tepper presciently said the following on CNBC:

“Either the economy is going to get better by itself in the next three months…What assets are going to do well? Stocks are going to do well, bonds won’t do so well, gold won’t do as well…Or the economy is not going to pick up in the next three months and the Fed is going to come in with QE (and the stock market will rise because of that).” 

Tepper repeated that analysis several times into 2013. Today, we know he was right because the Fed came to the rescue with QE several times. 

So, it should be a concern that the Fed has already begun to pull back. QE is tapering and will likely end by October 2014, and three of the seventeen Federal Reserve officials responsible for setting the fed funds rate believe it will rise in 2014. Twelve think it will rise in 2015. Only two of the seventeen believe fed funds will not rise until 2016. Nine of the seventeen believe the fed funds target rate will rise from its current 0%-0.25% to at least 1% next year. Three believe it will rise to 3% or higher, which would be a striking change. 

(http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130918.pdf).

But, make no mistake, whenever the fed funds rate rises, many investors will be surprised. According to the Research Foundation’s Fed study, the average equity return following a Fed interest rate policy increase was most pronounced in the month of the policy change, indicating that it wasn’t expected. The second-most pronounced effect of an increase came in the next month following the policy change. For the first month in a tightening period, stocks declined an average 2.05%.

So, what does Tepper think now? At the SALT Conference on May 14, 2014 he said:

“…there (are) times to make money and there (are) times not to lose money. This is probably (a time when) you’re supposed to think about preserving some of your money. If you’re 120 percent invested, it’s probably too much. You can still be long, but you probably should have some cash…I am nervous. I think it’s nervous time.” 

Tepper’s fund cut its net long exposure from 100% in December 2013 to 60% in May 2014.

(http://www.cnbc.com/id/101674055) 

Employment

While the market rose 144% since January 1, 2009, the underlying fundamentals of the economy have been weak, which is further evidence that the market has been largely driven by the Fed. GDP declined in the first quarter by a whopping 2.9%. Bad weather cannot explain the long-term weakness in the ratio of Employment-to-Population (E/Pop), which has barely budged from the nadir (58.2%) since the crisis abated. The chart of this ratio does not look like an economy that can justify a 144% rise in the S&P 500 Total Return Index since January 1, 2009 or 178% since the nadir. 

Ratio of Employment-to-Population (January 2006 through May 2014)

Source: BLS

Unlike the unemployment rate and the Labor Force Participation Rate, the E/Pop ratio implicitly assumes that every unemployed person of working age is looking for work. It may be the best indicator of economic robustness. The E/Pop has not been this low since the effects of the “malaise” of the 1970s, yet the S&P 500 Index has hit all-time highs dozens of times already this year. (http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/02/art4full.pdf) 

We probably should not anchor on the post-war high E/Pop of 64.7% in April 2000, or even the post-dotcom bust of 63.3% last reached in March 2007, but the 58.2% read in October 2013 is a post-1983 low. The latest figure is from June 2014. It is just 59%.

The Other Side of the Inflated-Market Argument

To help combat confirmation bias, I now present the other side to the top-down view that markets are inflated and approaching a bubble. Most of the counter-argument centers on four ideas: 1) there are flaws in each of the metrics outlined above; 2) after six years of anemic economic growth, the economy is due to break out; 3) forward PE ratios (today’s price relative to analysts’ earnings per share estimates for 2015) are not extraordinarily high; and 4) it’s different this time, so the Federal Reserve will not be able to tighten because the economy will not be strong enough. (Note to blog readers: the argument that stocks are the best alternative is not addressed  here because the letter makes clear that PAR believes all markets–stocks, bonds, housing, etc.–are inflated beyond levels that are justified by fundamentals.)

Point four contradicts the other points. For example, if it is different this time and the economy is not strong enough for the Fed to tighten, then it is hard to argue that forward earnings will be good or that the other metrics would point to better conditions if they weren’t so flawed. At least in the pessimistic case, all compasses point in the same direction. 

I think I understand all of the identified flaws in each metric above (e.g.  flaw: “the CAPE in 2012 was distorted by two recessions, which is unlikely to be repeated”) even if I disagree with the rationales for why they are flaws (e.g. Shiller used a ten-year horizon to capture long cycles). Also, the various flaws have always been in the measures, which make trends important. It is the trends that are troubling. 

I do not know where the economy is headed and I don’t know where earnings will be next year. But, I do agree with Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, who wrote the following in their latest book, Think Like a Freak:

“It has long been said that the three hardest words to say in the English language are ‘I Love You.’ We heartily disagree! For most people, it is much harder to say ‘I don’t know.’”

David Dreman demonstrated that analyst EPS estimates have been far off the mark for a long time. But, analysts have to keep on guessing because their institutional clients demand it and they cannot tell their clients the truth: that they just don’t know what forward EPS will be and that they could deliver more value to clients if clients would let them focus instead on what can be known about a business. Given analysts’ abysmal records in forecasting EPS, how can anyone find comfort in forward PE estimates? 

I hope the economy surprises to the upside and justifies today’s high stock market prices. All PAR can do is stick with its Separate Account Value Investing (SAVI)* discipline and buy stocks only when PAR finds a margin of safety, and “buy” call options that never expire on every company in the market (i.e. hold cash) when margins of safety do not exist. Those call options will be valuable one day.

Discipline is the key.

* SAVI is a separate account platform with Charles Schwab in which PAR invests client funds using PAR’s value investing processes. Clients have complete transparency into PAR’s activity in their account and clients control their separate account. Client funds are not commingled in the SAVI platform, so clients receive asset management tailored to their needs.

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At this month’s CFA Institute Annual Conference in Seattle, Sharpe said that Smart Beta made him sick because it implied that index investors had to be “dumb beta.” Sharpe believes the so-called dumb beta investors would eventually gravitate to Smart Beta strategies because no one is that dumb for long, and then the advantages of Smart Beta would simply melt away into average beta.

As regular readers know, Fama and French (F&F), and later Lakonishok et al. (LSV)  (See F&F and LSV tab above) demonstrated as early as 1992 that two factors consistently resulted in outperformance in the long run: Value and Small Cap. It is largely these two factors that put the “smart” in “Smart Beta.” F&F and LSV were not the first academics to publish papers on the value and small-cap factors, but they certainly popularized the factors in academia. Before these academics came along, we had research from practitioners Ben Graham from the 1930s through the 1970s; Warren Buffett from the 1950s to today; and Seth Klarman from the 1980s to today; that demonstrated that value strategies consistently outperform the market in the long run.

Since F&F and LSV published their research in the 1990s, there has been an overwhelming amount of academic research that demonstrates that value strategies outperform. Most of that research proves that value outperforms for reasons that are not related to risk, therefore value has consistently delivered alpha in the long run.

Most Smart Beta strategies are nothing more than systematic ways for managers to capture some of the factors that are known to deliver this alpha in the long run. The adoption of this approach in a more systematic and passive way somewhat proves Sharpe’s theory that no one stays that dumb for long. However, value and small-cap strategies outperform over long periods not necessarily because value and small-cap investors are smarter than everyone else, but because behavioral flaws and institutional constraints do not permit EVERYONE to FULLY capture the alpha in value and small cap. I remind you that it did take over 150 years for Smart Beta to be born.

Only small investors with contrarian streaks (see my future post on Investor DNA) can fully exploit these factors. Even Smart Beta strategies will fail to fully exploit these factors because of the amount of capital that Smart Beta will need to invest. Much of that capital will have to be allocated to large cap firms, but most of the alpha in these factors is found in relatively unknown and un-followed small-cap firms.

So, my answer to Sharpe’s queasiness is this: Smart Beta is just a label. Would he have taken less umbrage if that label were “Behavioral Beta” or “Factor-Focused Beta?”

http://advisorperspectives.com/newsletters14/Bill_Sharpe-Smart_beta_makes_me_sick.php

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