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We still have some way to go before asset prices normalize for the S&P 500 index, which makes up about 90% of US stock market capitalization. The CAPE and all price-to-fundamental ratios like it (e.g. Tobin’s Q, Buffett’s PE, etc.) are still high and they are all higher than their long-run averages by about the same percentage. That consistency reinforces the notion that it’s the market’s price that is the issue and not that there is something fundamentally different this time with respect to earnings, free cash flow or the replacement cost of business assets.

The CAPE is 24.90 after (last week’s) drop in the S&P 500 to 1970.89. Even if we generously assumed that real S&P earnings for the most recently available month (March 2015’s $100.57) was the proper figure to use in the denominator (as opposed to the lower real $79.13 S&P earnings over the last ten years), the S&P 500 index could still fall another 15% before the CAPE reached its long-term average (16.63). Unfortunately, no one knows when it will regress back to that level. It is impossible to predict it.

In addition, few consider that maybe the current CAPE average is too high. Both the numerator and denominator in the CAPE are adjusted for CPI inflation, so it reduces the ratio to long-run fundamental market and business activity. The CAPE averaged 14.78 from January 1881 through December 1994, which is 11% less than today’s CAPE average since 1881, largely because today’s CAPE average includes the greatest bubble in the market’s history (the dot com bubble). That suggests the S&P could fall 25% from 1970.89 even with the generous earnings figure used for the denominator.

PAR does not care about the market as a whole when it invests client funds in its Separate Account Value Investing (SAVI) strategies, so PAR is not investing as if the market were going to drop another 25%. PAR is still looking from the bottom up for SAVI  clients because that is the way to uncover opportunities that have an MOS, but there should be no surprise that there are far fewer opportunities when the CAPE is 24.9, like today, than when the CAPE is 13.3 as it was in March of 2009.

March 2009  was the last time PAR became fully invested. Most of those new positions in which PAR invested in 4Q08 and 1Q09 to become fully invested were gradually liquidated over the subsequent twelve- to eighteen-months and have largely sat in cash  since. PAR’s SAVI strategies are only a small part of PAR’s clients’ portfolios.

PAR Wealth Management also offers traditional wealth management services as a fee-only fiduciary. PAR Wealth Management is a goals-based financial adviser. Once a client’s goals are quantified and prioritized, PAR Wealth Management allocates that client’s capital to investments with qualities that match those specific goals and how a client feels about risk. Capital for short- and intermediate-term goals are generally allocated to safer, more-liquid investments. For a large percentage of a client’s long-term goal allocation, PAR Wealth Management generally chooses external managers who demonstrate an ability to capture factor premia.

Update 8-24-15: I do not want to leave the impression that the only way for the CAPE to normalize is for the S&P 500 to drop precipitously. The other way is for the denominator–earnings–to rise considerably. But, the denominator will not rise without growth in value-creating economic activity in the private sector, and that takes time. Value-creation has been stagnant since 2008 and there is little on the horizon to suggest that the private sector will turn robust. In any case, the numerator (the level of the S&P 500) would have to rise much slower than the denominator. So, either way, whether it is a numerator that falls or a denominator that rises or some combination, it portends low stock market returns over the next decade. As I have written before, invest accordingly.

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The first statistic is a macroeconomic indicator called the Employment-to-Population Ratio (E/Pop, to distinguish it from E/P or earnings yield). I prefer E/Pop to all other employment-health indicators because, unlike the unemployment and labor force participation rates, it takes the least amount of manipulation to calculate it.

E/Pop is simply the number of adults (16+ YO) employed in the US divided by the number of people 16+ living in the US who are not in institutions (jail, mental health facilities, etc.) or in the military. No one has to guess whether these people are “looking” for work or really “participating”. It measures the  number of people truly working relative to the number of us relying on those who are working to pay our collective bills. After all, the money that pays our bills can only come from people who produce; it is not created from thin air.

If there is a weakness in this indicator, it is that it overestimates economic strength by including in the numerator those who work part time, especially now when the proportion of part time workers is elevated.

http://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/Full-Time-vs-Part-Time-Employment.php

Robust economic conditions are indicated by relatively high E/Pop ratios and weak conditions by relatively low E/Pop ratios.

The E/Pop has indicated that the economy is weak and that this “recovery” since 2007 could easily be labeled “stagnation”. The E/Pop plummeted in the housing crisis and despite unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus, it has barely gotten off the mat since. May’s reading announced today is 59.4%. The last time (before the current stagnation) that it was this low was in April 1984 when the economy was still digesting Paul Volcker’s attempt to choke off the inflation debacle of the late 1970s.

The second statistic–one that continues to worry me about the stock market–is Robert Shiller’s Cyclically Adjusted PE (CAPE) ratio. The latest reading shows that the stock market’s price equals 27.38 times its trailing ten-year earnings. The last time it was this high was July 2007, almost to the day that the housing crisis began and about one year before the stock market plummeted in response. It was higher only twice before in history, just before two of history’s most terrifying market crashes.

I write about these “macro” themes because, as Howard Marks says, it’s important for “intelligent investors” to know where the economy and market stand as they go about their business of evaluating businesses one-by-one and determining whether they can purchase those businesses at prices that deliver a Margin of Safety. Since 2011, the level of the CAPE helps explains why investors have found so few opportunities that possess a Margin of Safety. Invest appropriately.

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The S&P 500 Index delivered a 13.69% return in 2014 as the market continued to reach new highs after reaching new highs in 2013. This year, for the first time, I have highlighted the years corresponding with the inflation and bursting of the DotCom bubble (grey) in addition to the Great Depression (yellow) and the Housing bubble (blue).

Clearly, there were more extremes and more years of extreme results during the Great Depression than the two most recent crises. In eight of the years from 1928 through 1938, the market either lost or gained more than 30%. In contrast, in each of the DotCom and the Housing bubble periods, the market had just one year of such an extreme.

There were obviously more extremes and more years of extreme outcomes during the Great Depression than the two most recent crises. Over the eight years from 1928 to 1938, generic cialis sales grew by 40% and you can read more about these successes on the main page of our website.

In half of all years since 1825, the market delivered a return between -10% and +10%. So, if we narrow the definition of extreme to losses or gains of more than 10%, the Great Depression experienced nine such years, the DotCom bubble five, and the Housing bubble five.

Many argue that the Federal Reserve is getting better at managing crises, and the above data would seem to agree. The Great Depression was the first crisis that the Fed experienced and many recent policy makers, including Ben Bernanke, went to school on Great Depression policy. On the other hand, others argue that the mere awareness of a Federal Reserve “put” is creating crises that future Fed policy will be unable to fix. I guess we will know who is right soon enough.

The return mode is still 0% to 10%. In a large majority (71%) of years, the market is positive. And, the market experiences declines of 10% (20%) or more in a mere 13.7% (4.9%) of years. So, an outsider’s perspective indicates that investing in the broad market is clearly in your favor, in part because of natural inflationary increases, and in part because of real increases in productivity and earnings due to technological and human capital advances.

The insider’s perspective is a different story. As of January 19, 2015, Shiller’s CAPE sits at 26.7, which is 61% above the average CAPE of 16.6 since January, 1881. The only periods in which the CAPE was higher than today were 1929 – 1930, immediately before the Great Depression; late 1996 – 2002, immediately before and after the DotCom bubble burst; and from late 2004 – late 2007, immediately before the bursting of the housing bubble. So, the CAPE is not a great short-term timing mechanism because recent extremes were able to persist for long periods, but it is an excellent indicator that the piper has to be paid eventually.

Other market indicators including Tobin’s Q and Buffett’s PE confirm the implications of Shiller’s CAPE. Investors who were cautious in periods like this had dry powder to exploit market declines. Investors who chased returns in periods like this rode the market without a brake (a hedge) and often only got off the ride by jumping off at market lows.

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Hire advisors who understand risk and know how to manage it well.

The Market from the Top Down, the Federal Reserve, and the Economy

PAR’s pessimism is due to a dearth of bottom-up bargains. (Few businesses can be purchased at prices that deliver a margin of safety.)

A top-down analysis reveals a significantly overvalued market, which merely confirms the dearth of bargains. Shiller’s CAPE, Buffett’s PE, Tobin’s Q, and profit margins are at or near all-time highs (other than during the dotcom bubble) while interest rates are near historic lows.

Shiller’s CAPE

As of July 3, the CAPE was 26.6, which would require a 31% drop to reach its post-war average of 18.4 (including the dotcom bubble in that average).

Shiller’s CAPE (S&P 500 Index /10-Year Average Earnings)

Source: Multipl.com and www.econ.yale.edu/~Shiller/data.htm

I have been writing about the CAPE for a while in letters and on my blog. Although it has been above its long-term average since early 2009 (and for most of the time since 1990), it is not a good indicator for short-term market timing.

At these CAPE levels, stocks are unlikely to deliver much more than low single-digit returns per year over the next decade and the market is vulnerable to large corrections. Since 1881, with the exception of the dotcom bubble, every time that the CAPE reached 24 (April 1901, November 1928, and January 1966) inflation-adjusted losses of 29% or more followed within 4.5 years and peak-to-trough losses were much higher. In this cycle, the CAPE first reached 24 in November 2013. But the market has also severely corrected when the CAPE was lower than 24.

William Poundstone wrote the following in his latest book, Rock Breaks Scissors:

“Today’s investors have every right to feel cursed. They have had few opportunities to buy at average (CAPE levels) much less low ones…The average return at (a CAPE of 23) is something like 2 percent over the coming 20 years. Never has the twenty-year stock market returned as much as 3 percent annually (after inflation) when the (CAPE) was 23 or higher.”

Largely because of the CAPE level, as of May 31, 2014, GMO thinks that US large-cap and small-cap stock real returns will average -1.5% and -4.5%, respectively, each year for the next seven years.

Market Cap-to-GDP (AKA Buffett’s PE) 

Buffett’s favorite measure of market price-to-earnings is the ratio depicted in the chart below, which indicates that the market is about 45% overvalued.

Source Listed in Chart

GMO believes that whenever a measure of market prices (relative to market fundamentals) is two standard deviations from its long-term average, then that market is in a bubble. According to GMO’s definition, Buffett’s PE indicates the market is currently in a bubble. However, Grantham prefers the CAPE (along with other measures) over Buffett’s PE and he believes the S&P 500 will not enter bubble territory until it reaches about 2,250. As of July 4, it’s only 13% away from that mark. 

Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q Ratio is a measure of the market’s price-to-book ratio. It equals market value relative to the cost to replace the assets of the businesses in the market. The numerator is the same as the one in Buffett’s PE Ratio. The Q indicates that the market is about 41% overvalued.

Source Listed in Chart 

Profit Margins

Corporate profit margins are at all-time highs. Because high profit margins attract competition in free markets, Jeremy Grantham of GMO calls margins the most mean-reverting statistic in finance and economics. If margins decline, EPS will decline, leading to a decline in stock prices. 

Corporate Profit Margins

Source Listed in Chart and dshort.com

John Hussman of Hussman Funds notes that investors who pay high prices for high profit margins are almost always disappointed in profit growth later.

Source: Hussman Funds

Interest Rates

Interest rates are important because declining rates translate into a higher present value of cash flow, which translates into higher asset prices. It is hard to imagine rates falling much more from here after the 33-year bull market in bonds, but it is easy to imagine rates rising, which will cause present values (and markets) to decline, all other things being equal. 

Source Listed in Chart

The Federal Reserve

“This goes down right now as the mother of all reflation strategies by the Federal Reserve…The cycle starts off with asset inflation, followed by credit inflation, followed by price inflation, and then by wage inflation.” –David Rosenberg, on CNBC’s Squawk on the Street 6/24/14

It appears that a major reason for the market’s rise since 2010 has been the extraordinary measures used by the Federal Reserve to offset the effects of the financial crisis. Quantitative Easing 1, 2, and 3 (QE) has created an environment for company stock buybacks and M&A activity largely by lowering the cost of corporate debt issuance to finance buybacks and M&A. 

In 2013, S&P 500 company buybacks totaled $477 Billion, the most since the 2007 peak. Fortuna Advisors estimates that since the 2009 lows, buybacks juiced cumulative returns from a natural 80% to a steroid-like 178% reached in the first quarter of 2014.

(http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/corporations-cant-stop-gobbling-up-their-own-stock/2014/05/09/83c8ddb0-d6e6-11e3-aae8-c2d44bd79778_story.html)

Of course, it is what happens at the margin—the last trade—that determines your portfolio value. The stock of corporate buybacks over the last three years will be of little consolation in a declining market unless you have already sold into buybacks and are holding the proceeds in cash. 

Further evidence of a Fed-fueled market include: 1) margin debt used to purchase equities is as high as in the dotcom bubble; 2) the junk bond market has been raging again; and 3) IPOs—insiders who want to cash out before the punch bowl is pulled away—are as high as in the dotcom era. 

Correlation is not causation, but there is good reason to believe the Federal Reserve’s extraordinary balance sheet expansion since the crisis (depicted below) is responsible for much of the froth.

Source: ZeroHedge.com

A 2000 publication from the CFA Institute’s Research Foundation studied asset class returns during periods of expansionary and restrictive monetary policy. It should give pause.  

The study (http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/abs/10.2470/rf.v2000.n3.3912) covered the years 1960 through 1998. The average monthly nominal stock market return in expansionary periods was 1.64%. The average in restrictive periods was 0.38%. All eleven periods of expansionary monetary policy over those 38 years resulted in a positive monthly average real return, but five out of the ten (50%) restrictive periods resulted in negative average monthly real returns. Clearly, the maxim “Don’t fight the fed” has a lot of truth in it.

David Tepper

One investor who refused to fight the Fed was the highest earning hedge fund manager in 2013. On September 24, 2010, David Tepper presciently said the following on CNBC:

“Either the economy is going to get better by itself in the next three months…What assets are going to do well? Stocks are going to do well, bonds won’t do so well, gold won’t do as well…Or the economy is not going to pick up in the next three months and the Fed is going to come in with QE (and the stock market will rise because of that).” 

Tepper repeated that analysis several times into 2013. Today, we know he was right because the Fed came to the rescue with QE several times. 

So, it should be a concern that the Fed has already begun to pull back. QE is tapering and will likely end by October 2014, and three of the seventeen Federal Reserve officials responsible for setting the fed funds rate believe it will rise in 2014. Twelve think it will rise in 2015. Only two of the seventeen believe fed funds will not rise until 2016. Nine of the seventeen believe the fed funds target rate will rise from its current 0%-0.25% to at least 1% next year. Three believe it will rise to 3% or higher, which would be a striking change. 

(http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130918.pdf).

But, make no mistake, whenever the fed funds rate rises, many investors will be surprised. According to the Research Foundation’s Fed study, the average equity return following a Fed interest rate policy increase was most pronounced in the month of the policy change, indicating that it wasn’t expected. The second-most pronounced effect of an increase came in the next month following the policy change. For the first month in a tightening period, stocks declined an average 2.05%.

So, what does Tepper think now? At the SALT Conference on May 14, 2014 he said:

“…there (are) times to make money and there (are) times not to lose money. This is probably (a time when) you’re supposed to think about preserving some of your money. If you’re 120 percent invested, it’s probably too much. You can still be long, but you probably should have some cash…I am nervous. I think it’s nervous time.” 

Tepper’s fund cut its net long exposure from 100% in December 2013 to 60% in May 2014.

(http://www.cnbc.com/id/101674055) 

Employment

While the market rose 144% since January 1, 2009, the underlying fundamentals of the economy have been weak, which is further evidence that the market has been largely driven by the Fed. GDP declined in the first quarter by a whopping 2.9%. Bad weather cannot explain the long-term weakness in the ratio of Employment-to-Population (E/Pop), which has barely budged from the nadir (58.2%) since the crisis abated. The chart of this ratio does not look like an economy that can justify a 144% rise in the S&P 500 Total Return Index since January 1, 2009 or 178% since the nadir. 

Ratio of Employment-to-Population (January 2006 through May 2014)

Source: BLS

Unlike the unemployment rate and the Labor Force Participation Rate, the E/Pop ratio implicitly assumes that every unemployed person of working age is looking for work. It may be the best indicator of economic robustness. The E/Pop has not been this low since the effects of the “malaise” of the 1970s, yet the S&P 500 Index has hit all-time highs dozens of times already this year. (http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1981/02/art4full.pdf) 

We probably should not anchor on the post-war high E/Pop of 64.7% in April 2000, or even the post-dotcom bust of 63.3% last reached in March 2007, but the 58.2% read in October 2013 is a post-1983 low. The latest figure is from June 2014. It is just 59%.

The Other Side of the Inflated-Market Argument

To help combat confirmation bias, I now present the other side to the top-down view that markets are inflated and approaching a bubble. Most of the counter-argument centers on four ideas: 1) there are flaws in each of the metrics outlined above; 2) after six years of anemic economic growth, the economy is due to break out; 3) forward PE ratios (today’s price relative to analysts’ earnings per share estimates for 2015) are not extraordinarily high; and 4) it’s different this time, so the Federal Reserve will not be able to tighten because the economy will not be strong enough. (Note to blog readers: the argument that stocks are the best alternative is not addressed  here because the letter makes clear that PAR believes all markets–stocks, bonds, housing, etc.–are inflated beyond levels that are justified by fundamentals.)

Point four contradicts the other points. For example, if it is different this time and the economy is not strong enough for the Fed to tighten, then it is hard to argue that forward earnings will be good or that the other metrics would point to better conditions if they weren’t so flawed. At least in the pessimistic case, all compasses point in the same direction. 

I think I understand all of the identified flaws in each metric above (e.g.  flaw: “the CAPE in 2012 was distorted by two recessions, which is unlikely to be repeated”) even if I disagree with the rationales for why they are flaws (e.g. Shiller used a ten-year horizon to capture long cycles). Also, the various flaws have always been in the measures, which make trends important. It is the trends that are troubling. 

I do not know where the economy is headed and I don’t know where earnings will be next year. But, I do agree with Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, who wrote the following in their latest book, Think Like a Freak:

“It has long been said that the three hardest words to say in the English language are ‘I Love You.’ We heartily disagree! For most people, it is much harder to say ‘I don’t know.’”

David Dreman demonstrated that analyst EPS estimates have been far off the mark for a long time. But, analysts have to keep on guessing because their institutional clients demand it and they cannot tell their clients the truth: that they just don’t know what forward EPS will be and that they could deliver more value to clients if clients would let them focus instead on what can be known about a business. Given analysts’ abysmal records in forecasting EPS, how can anyone find comfort in forward PE estimates? 

I hope the economy surprises to the upside and justifies today’s high stock market prices. All PAR can do is stick with its Separate Account Value Investing (SAVI)* discipline and buy stocks only when PAR finds a margin of safety, and “buy” call options that never expire on every company in the market (i.e. hold cash) when margins of safety do not exist. Those call options will be valuable one day.

Discipline is the key.

* SAVI is a separate account platform with Charles Schwab in which PAR invests client funds using PAR’s value investing processes. Clients have complete transparency into PAR’s activity in their account and clients control their separate account. Client funds are not commingled in the SAVI platform, so clients receive asset management tailored to their needs.

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1. He’s super-smart;

Yet, as Buffett himself has said, if you have more than 130 IQ points you should sell the excess because you won’t need it to be a great investor. In fact, that extra IQ may be detrimental if it leads to behavioral flaws such as overconfidence or lack of discipline.

2. He’s guided by an overarching philosophy;

That philosophy is value investing, which can be executed in several forms.

3. He’s mentally flexible;

It may seem as if Buffett had a change in philosophy when he transitioned from Ben Graham’s “Net Net” and “Cigar Butt” approaches to investing to Charlie Munger’s “wide-moat” approach. However, all three approaches are guided by the value-investing tenet that requires a Margin of Safety.

Graham’s margin of safety was found in businesses trading at less than the net value of their assets. Munger’s approach of investing in under-appreciated companies with wide moats found a margin of safety in well-run business with pricing power and even growth. The key is in the qualifier “under-appreciated.”  Value investors love growth, but tend to be more skeptical of growth projections than glamour investors, and are usually better at maintaining discipline when pricing growth, and rightly so.

Hence, value investors usually buy fast-growing, wide-moat companies only when the market does not fully appreciate their wide moats as much as it should. One example: Buffett paid $1.02 billion for shares of Coca Cola by the end of 1989 after the 1987 crash had damaged Coke’s shares. By 1999, that investment was worth $11.6 billion according to Hagstrom.

4. He’s unemotional;

Marks: “Many of the obstacles to investment success relate to human emotion…perhaps worst of all, (most investors) have a tendency to judge how they’re doing based on how others are doing, and to let envy of others’ success force them to take additional risk… (Warren) doesn’t care whether others think he’s right or whether his investment decisions promptly (my emphasis) make him look right.”

My Take: Warren is disciplined, which can make a person appear unemotional. I would be willing to bet that on more than one occasion in his career he lost sleep over a decision, but that his discipline allowed logic to triumph.

5. He’s contrarian and iconoclastic;

As Charlie Munger likes to say, I have nothing more to add.

6. He’s counter-cyclical;

Marks: “Many of the best investors accept that they can’t predict what the macro future holds in terms of economic developments, interest rates and market fluctuations…the greatest bargains are accessed by buying when the economy and companies are suffering…how many acted as boldly (as Buffett) when fear of financial collapse was rampant (in 2009)?”

7. He has a long-term focus and is unconcerned with volatility;

One should only invest in the equity or long-term debt of businesses to cover long term liabilities such as college tuition that is due in twenty years, retirement liabilities, and bequests, so volatility is the friend of the long-term value investor. Volatility gives the long-term value investor the chance to buy low and eventually sell high, in contrast to what most investors do; that is, buying when rising prices make them feel good and selling when plummeting prices are too painful to bear.

This is where a good wealth advisor comes in for an individual investor or family office. He or she will help such investors identify their goals and estimate when the invoices for those goals need to be paid. Then, a good advisor will allocate assets to broad asset categories that “immunize” those liabilities and help make the euphoria of rising prices and pain of plummeting ones easier to ignore and bear because short-term goals are covered in cash or high-quality short-term debt, and opportunities to cover long-term goals will arise over a multi-decade run.

This is known in High Net-Worth Investor (HNWI) Wealth Management circles as Goals-Based Investing (GBI).  The underlying assumption is that all investors would be happy to simply meet their goals and avoid their nightmares so that they can focus on their careers and the things that make them happy.

In GBI, capital for near-term goals is held mostly in cash and short-term bills, and capital for long-term goals is invested in less liquid or more volatile (in the short run) investments such as equities, long-term debt, real estate, and alternatives in order to exploit the return premiums that are available there.

Within asset categories a good advisor will help clients find investment managers who understand each asset’s risks and who can manage those risks well. He will also find managers who can exploit specific premiums in those asset classes such as the value premium in equity investments.

8. He’s unafraid to bet big on his best ideas;

So many active investors have capital spread thinly, and almost all of it is allocated to S&P 500 companies. They have low “active share,” so they are essentially closet indexers who charge higher fees than indexers.

9. He’s willing to be inactive;

According to a speech that Seth Klarman delivered at a Grant’s conference in the fall of 2013, Baupost Group has about 50% in cash. Klarman is fearful of returning cash to his investors because he believes that they may go out and invest it with a hot-hand manager and will suffer during an inevitable shakeout.

PAR views cash as an investment in an option on every asset, an option that has no expiration date. That option is worth quite a lot right now.

10. Finally, he’s not worried about losing his job;

Professional portfolio managers who work for large firms lose their jobs if they underperform. That is why many make the rational decision to become closet indexers in order to hug their benchmark and avoid underperformance.

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http://amarginofsafety.com/2013/03/01/the-equity-market-annual-return-histogram-updated-for-2012/

Yesterday’s Wall Street Journal Ahead of the Tape column by Spencer Jakab had a chart titled  ”Unhinged,” in which Jakab showed average stock market returns relative to average GDP growth during the last eleven recoveries from a recession. The market return is almost FIVE times GDP growth in the current expansion, but averaged only 1.47 times GDP growth in the previous ten recoveries.

Is 2013 going to be one of the once-every-nineteen-years when the market rises over 40%? Can a market rise that much on Federal Reserve balance sheet growth alone? Perhaps, like in 1928, this party is still in the ten o’clock hour. What will happen when the clock strikes midnight?

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As Michael Mauboussin says, when understanding an investment idea, we should try take an outsider’s big-picture view in addition to our own expert view of the minutiae of the idea. I first came across the equity market return histogram a few years ago and I believe it offers perspective on the feasibility of return expectations.

The ranges at the bottom are the ranges of returns for each annual period. The years highlighted in blue are the years involving the recent Great Recession and those in orange involve the Great Depression. As you can see, there were many more outliers during the Great Depression. The Great Recession looks rather normal in comparison.

My opinion of expected returns is based on data obtained in the Graham-Shiller CAPE index and from Tobin’s Q ratio (plus several other metrics), so I expect low, single-digit equity market returns over the next eight- to ten-years. The CAPE, which measures long-term Price/Earnings ratios, and the Q, which measures Price/Replacement-Cost ratios for the market, are 39.1% and  40.6% higher, respectively, than their long-term averages.

But, if we believe past is prologue, then there is a 75.5% chance that returns this year will fall outside of the range of 0% to +10%. I believe I am rationally pessimistic for the near term (but a long-term rational optimist), but historically there is only a 13.9% chance that an investor will lose more than 10% of their capital in any year in the market. This kind of outsider’s perspective helps me temper my pessimism, but the best way to temper it is to invest with a MARGIN OF SAFETY. Unfortunately, few investments offer a Margin of Safety these days.

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Still, for the market to avoid moving downward toward its fundamental averages, one would have to expect significant positive economic developments in the near term such as skyrocketing productivity, job growth, and earnings growth. Is there anything on the horizon that makes you feel that these positive developments are just around the corner?

Media explanations for daily market price movements are usually vague guesses, but it seems there are plenty who are willing to bet their clients’ money on it. It seems there are many people holding out hope for some kind of deus ex machina so that just about any rumor helps the market temporarily avoid its fate.

Here is an explanation from today’s Dow Jones Newswire’s Market Talk Column for today’s late swing in the market:

4:05 (Dow Jones) US stocks pull a fast one – a very fast one – in the last hour, rallying almost maniacally in the last 10 minutes of trading to finish higher after falling sharply in the morning. DJIA jumps 69 (0.6%) to 11061, after sliding as much as 168 earlier; S&P 500 gains 8 (0.7%) to 1162, Nasdaq Comp rises 27 (1.1%) to 2495. Fears of Greek default drove morning’s sell-off. Rumors in the afternoon that – wait for it – the Chinese would buy (or are buying) Italian debt seems to have driven the rally.

A rumor that the Chinese may buy Italian debt is the deus ex machina for the world economy?

The problem in Europe and the rest of the developed world is a decades-long lack of productivity combined with a population that expected much. We all wanted something for nothing. Up until now, politicians in the developed world made many promises to their constituents and only asked for office in return. Those promises resulted in policies that helped accelerate our resource consumption from the future to the past and present.

For example, in the US think of long-term policies such as Social Security; Medicare; subsidized housing in the tax code; tax policies that favor debt over equity; etc.; and short-term policies such as cash-for-clunkers. Each allowed individuals or corporations to:

• avoid saving for retirement;
• avoid saving for medical care that will surely be needed one day;
• avoid saving for a large down payment on a house or car; or
• encouraged the use of debt to expand or buy a business

In each case, more wealth could be exhausted earlier in one’s life than it could without such policies. In each case, a larger amount of resources are guaranteed to be exhausted in the future to pay for present consumption, which of course means less will be available for future consumption of anything.

Those promises also created incentives for people to shun the productive work that leads to real wealth creation and created incentives to simply seek handouts. But, that can only go on for so long and now it is time to pay the bills.

I need to understand how that translates into the optimism that is keeping the market floating above its long-term fundamental averages. How does receiving a large bill for prior consumption make one optimistic about the economy and the market in the near future? How is that bill going to be paid, if not with long-deferred gratification? Do you think dumb-money, say from the Chinese, will pay the bill free of negative conditions? I do not. What exactly can Italy offer the Chinese? And then, which trap door will the deus ex machina come from for Greece, Ireland, Spain, the US, Japan…

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“Since the investors of the ‘I Know’ school, described in chapter 14, feel it’s possible to know the future, they decide what it will look like, build portfolios designed to maximize returns under that one scenario, and largely disregard the other possibilities. The suboptimizers of the ‘I don’t know’ school, on the other hand, put their emphasis on constructing portfolios that will do well in the scenarios they consider likely and not too poorly in the rest. 

Investors who belong to the ‘I know’ school predict how the dice will come up, attribute their successes to their astute sense of the future, and blame bad luck when things don’t go their way. When they’re right, the question that has to be asked is ‘Could they really have seen the future or couldn’t they?’ Because their approach is probabilistic, investors of the ‘I don’t know’ school understand that the outcome is largely up to the gods, and thus that the credit or blame accorded the investors—especially in the short run—should be appropriately limited.

The ‘I know’ school quickly and confidently divides its members into winners and losers based on the first roll or two of the dice. Investors of the ‘I don’t know’ school understand that their skill should be judged over a large number of rolls, not just one (and that rolls can be few and far between). Thus they accept that their cautious, suboptimizing approach may produce undistinguished results for a while, but they’re confident that if they’re superior investors, that will be apparent in the long run.”

Marks opened his Chapter 14 with three great quotes, one of which I use all of the time:

We have two classes of forecasters: Those who don’t know–and those who don’t know they don’t know. –John Kenneth Galbraith

He closed the chapter with a quote that I will have to start using often:

It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you in trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”–Mark Twain

As Marks said, “…investing as if you know what’s coming is close to nuts.”

Are you prepared to pick off bargains, or are you one of the people in the “I know” school who was fully invested on July 7 and selling indiscriminately today? Can you trust your contrarian instincts when those instincts are supported by hard, knowable data, or will you follow the herd and the prognosticators? Which way you answer often accounts for the difference between investment success and failure.

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